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THE RISE AND FALL OF U.C.C. SECTION 1-207
AND THE FULL PAYMENT CHECK-
CHECKMATE?
Paula G. Walter*
I. INTRODUCTION
The common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction is in danger of
losing its distinctive status as an efficient, informal, inexpensive and
quick out-of-court means of resolving and settling disputes.'
The accord and satisfaction doctrine is predicated on the assump-
tion that when a bona fide or good faith disagreement as to an unliqui-
dated claim arises between two individuals, an offer by one party2 to
* Assistant Professor, Baruch College. B.A., 1970, McGill University; B.C.L., 1973,
McGill University; LL.B., 1974, McGill University; Member Province of Ontario Bar, Can-
ada; Member New York State Bar. Professor Walter has written articles on restrictive cove-
nants in employment contracts, the commercial impossibility defense, and the "business
judgment" rule.
1. For a discussion of the "conditional" or "full payment" check and the U.C.C. section
1-207 dilemma, see generally, J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2d ed. 1980); Burnham, A Primer on Accord and Satisfac-
tion, 47 MONT. L. REV. 1 (1986); Carabello, The Tender Trap: U.C.C. Section 1-207 and Its
Applicability To An Attempted Accord and Satisfaction by Tendering a Check in a Dispute
Arising From a Sale of Goods, 11 SETON HALL L. REv. 445 (1981); Del Duca, Handling "Full
Payment" Checks, 13 U.C.C. L.J. 195 (1981); Grosse & Goggin, Accord and Satisfaction and
the 1-207 Dilemma, 89 CoM. L.J. 537 (1984); Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.. § 1-207 on the
Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check 74 COM. L. J. 329 (1969); Rosen-
thal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM.
L. REv. 48 (1978); Comment, Accord and Satisfaction: Conditional Tender by Check Under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 539 (1969); Comment, Does U.C.C.
Section 1-207 Apply to the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check?, 11
CREIGHTON L. REV. 515 (1977); Note, Contracts--Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code Not Intended to Apply to Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction. Jahn v. Bums, 593 P.2d
828 (Wyo. 1979), 15 LAND & WATER L. REV. 737 (1980); Comment, Accord and Satisfac-
tion-Release-Check Tendered in Full Payment of Liquidated Debt and Subsequently En-
dorsed Under Protest by Creditor Operates as a Written Release, 1 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 425
(1970); Comment, Accord and Satisfaction Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-207:
Scholl v. Tallman, 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 921 (1977) [hereinafter Comment, Accord and Satisfac-
tion]; Comment, Rights, Fights, and Delights of U. C C. 1-207: On the Reservation in the Land
of Uniformity, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 791 (1985); Note, Commercial Transactions-Michigan Re-
jects UCC and Adopts Minority Common Law Standard for Conditional Check Accord and
Satisfaction, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1067 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Commercial Transactions].
2. Usually the party is the debtor or the obligor in the contractual relationship.
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settle the dispute is an accord, which, if accepted by the other party, 3
constitutes a satisfaction.
The common law's all-or-nothing approach gave birth to the recog-
nition that in some instances permitting a debtor to place the creditor in,
what one commentator aptly termed, an "exquisite form of commercial
torture"4 is both unwise and unreasonable. Those aware of the need to
accommodate the businessman's cash-flow needs, while simultaneously
preserving his ability to pursue his legal remedies within the court sys-
tem, argue that adoption of section 1-207' of the Uniform Commercial
Code grants the businessman that precise avenue of redress. On the
other hand, adversaries of this view contend that the drafters of section
1-207 never intended to have these consequences imparted to it. The
case law reflects this muddle.
The crux of this controversy is whether such a unilateral attempt by
the debtor to modify an existing agreement will be deemed a settlement
of the parties' differences. In particular, should the tender of partial pay-
ment, in the form of a check,6 in an amount less than the full amount
required under that contract, result in a discharge of the respective par-
ties' obligations under that contract without further liability to either
side?
Under the classic common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction,
the creditor-payee had two options available if he deemed the proffered
settlement inappropriate. He could either return the check to the debtor-
drawer or he could choose to negotiate the check. If the creditor elected
the latter course of action, however, and obtained immediate use of the
funds, he simultaneously relinquished any successful legal claim to the
balance.
The common law responded to the creditor-payee's choice to negoti-
ate the check after obliterating the debtor-drawer's conditional "full pay-
ment" notation, or after endorsing the check with his own restrictive
conditions, by imputing to the creditor an objective intention to accept
the offer of settlement. At common law, the creditor's true subjective
intention was of little consequence. As Chief Judge Cardozo wrote in
3. Usually the party is the creditor or the obligee in the contractual relationship.
4. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, §§ 13-21.
5. Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides: "A party who with explicit
reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in manner
demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such
words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like are sufficient." U.C.C. § 1-207 (1978).
6. There is no one universally accepted term to describe this check. Consequently, the
terms "conditional check" or "full payment check" will be used interchangeably to refer to
this check.
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Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co.': "Protest will . . . be unavailing if the
money is retained. What is said is overridden by what is done, and assent
is imputed as an inference of law."8 Actions speak louder and more
clearly than words, and the common law treated the author of language
of protest on a "full payment" check accordingly. The question is, has
the Uniform Commercial Code abrogated the common law?
Immediately after the adoption of section 1-207, one scholar9 con-
cluded that the majority viewpoint favored the position that the com-
mon-law doctrine had indeed been abrogated. However, in the aftermath
of several decisions,10 the academic community" recognized that in what
might originally have been an overlooked section of the Code resided
potentially explosive consequences to informal settlements as embodied
in the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. When did the
majority position turn into the minority position? Some of the credit for
the about-face can be directly attributed to scholarly articles.12
Another observable trend is that of the "bandwagon effect." Where
a greater number of jurisdictions have adopted a particular view, the
courts of sister jurisdictions assume that the "majority view" is the "bet-
ter view," irrespective of the merits of that view.13 One author1 4 charac-
terized this viewpoint as one of judicial timidity wherein, "[iun view of
this limited precedent and the lack of agreement among legal scholars,
we withhold adopting a particular judicial interpretation of section 1-207
at this time."' 5
The purpose of this Article is to determine to what extent, if any,
section 1-207 has altered the common-law doctrine of accord and satis-
faction. Is there a national law or a state-by-state law? In addition, an
attempt will be made to explore and define the parameters of section 1-
207. Does the section apply to non-Code-covered transactions as well as
7. 258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373 (1932).
8. Id. at 171, 179 N.E. at 374.
9. Del Duca, supra note 1.
10. Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1044 (Westchester [N.Y.] County
Court, 1965); Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85
(1969); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
11. See Hawkland, supra note 1; Rosenthal, supra note 1.
12. See supra note 8.
13. R.A. Reither Constr., Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Colo.
1984). "The view, which has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions and which we
hereby adopt, is that section 4-1-207 does not alter the well established law of accord and
satisfaction [cites Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, New Jersey, Washington & Wyoming
cases]". Id.
14. Note, Commercial Transactions, supra note 1.
15. Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329, 338, 273 N.W.2d 425, 429 (1978).
November 1987]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
to Code-covered transactions? Does the usage of a check always trans-
form the underlying obligation into a Code-covered transaction? Is there
a state-by-state distinction in this matter?
In the recent decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Horn
Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 6 the highest court in
that state focused its attention on the essential nature of section 1-207.
There the court held:
Indeed, the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction
creates a cruel dilemma for the good-faith creditor in posses-
sion of a full payment check .... A fortiori, if liberally con-
strued, as the Code's provisions are explicitly intended to be, it
seems clear that the reach of § 1-207 is sufficiently extensive to
alter the doctrine of accord and satisfaction by permitting a
creditor to reserve his rights though accepting the debtor's
check. '
However, the conflicting case law within New York state and the
inconsistent decisions of its sister jurisdictions do not provide the cer-
tainty, finality or predictability which is of critical importance to busi-
nessmen. The purpose of this Article is to provide guidance in
approaching this crucial issue.
II. THE COMMON-LAW DOCTRINE OF ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Contract law permits the rescission or variation of a contract by
subsequent agreement.'" The object of a rescission is to release the par-
ties from the contract as drawn. When the parties to a contract still have
outstanding rights against each other, that is, where the contract is exec-
utory, the subsequent agreement to rescind the original contract is sup-
ported by consideration. 9 However, when the contract is wholly
executed by one party, the subsequent agreement to release the other
party to the contract from performing his obligations is not supported by
consideration because the obligor does not give up anything by agreeing
to rescind. Therefore, separate and valid consideration must be found, or
the subsequent agreement will not be a binding contract. The question
16. 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985).
17. Id. at 327, 488 N.E.2d at 59-60, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 313-14.
18. San Gabriel Valley Ready-Mixt v. Casillas, 142 Cal. App. 2d 137, 298 P.2d 76 (1956);
Currie v. Trammel, 289 S.W. 736 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Cooke v. McAdoo, 85 N.J.L. 692, 90
A. 302 (1914).
19. Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (1602) ("but the gift of a horse, hawk, or robe,
etc. in satisfaction is good."). Such analysis could not be said to apply to the fully executed
contract since there would be no consideration for the initial cancellation. A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS § 1284 (1962).
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arises whether a creditor's acceptance of a sum of money tendered as
"full payment" which is less than the amount owed under the original
contract is supported by sufficient consideration.2 °
A. Liquidated Claims Versus Unliquidated Claims
A further distinction has arisen in the case law to clarify those cate-
gories of claims where subsequent agreements are supported by consider-
ation and, therefore, enforceable. Where the subject matter of the
subsequent agreement is a liquidated claim-one with regard to which
there is no dispute by the contracting parties-a subsequent promise by a
party to pay less than the amount due under the original agreement is not
supported by consideration because that party is already under a pre-
existing legal duty to pay that amount."1 Conversely, if the subject mat-
ter of the subsequent contract relates to an unliquidated claim-a claim
that one of the parties is honestly disputing22 -a settlement of that dis-
pute provides the necessary ingredient of consideration. In this situation,
an accord and satisfaction has taken place. The accord 3 consists in the
agreement and the satisfaction 4 in the execution of that agreement. An
accord is a contract under which an obligee-creditor promises to accept a
stated performance in satisfaction of the obligor's-debtor's existing duty.
Performance of the accord discharges the original duty.
B. Case Law
An accord and satisfaction occurs even where a creditor simultane-
ously cashes a check and rejects the condition upon which the check is
tendered.25 "The actual subjective intent of the creditor does not mat-
ter[;] if the creditor cashes a 'full payment check' the creditor is deemed
20. The debtor (offeror) makes it clear to the creditor (offeree) that he is making an offer
by way of tender of a check. This offer is not negotiable but must be accepted as all other
offers, that is, on its terms.
21. Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (1602); Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L. 1884);
Dickinson v. Fletcher, 181 Or. 316, 182 P.2d 371 (1947).
22. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts has defined the term "bona fide" to mean
honesty. Merriman v. Thomas, 133 Me. 326, 177 A. 615 (1935).
23. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, section 281, comment a, states that "[ain ac-
cord is a contract by which an obligee promises to accept a substituted performance in future
satisfaction of the obligor's duty.. . 2" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281 com-
ment a (1981).
24. Section 35 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts states that "it is the essence of an
accord that the original duty is not satisfied until the accord is performed .... " Id.
25. Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, 664
P.2d 419 (1983); Wilcox Press v. Beauty Fashion, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 988, 423 N.Y.S.2d 564
(1980). But cf. Kroulee Corp. v. A. Klein & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 441, 426 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1980);
Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or. 425, 571 P.2d 503 (1977).
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to have accepted the debtor's condition of tender."26
In some jurisdictions, where a creditor merely scratches out or er-
ases the notation on the back of the check without expressly reserving
any rights to claim the balance from the debtor, that obliteration is not
sufficient to prevent an accord and satisfaction.27 Moreover, in one case,
the creditor scratched out the debtor's condition on the check and en-
dorsed the check, writing the words "without recourse." This endorse-
ment was held not to be an explicit reservation of rights.2" Where the
creditor obliterates the debtor's conditions on the check, cashes the
check and thereafter sends a letter to the debtor purporting to reserve his
rights, that too will fail to reserve the creditor's rights since the debtor
will not have had an opportunity to consider the options of accepting the
creditor's decision or stopping payment.29
In one case, however, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court
of New York held section 1-207 to be applicable where the checks offered
by the debtor and cashed by the creditor had neither been conditioned by
the debtor in any way nor restrictively endorsed by the creditor. 0 The
debtor urged for purposes of finding an accord that section 1-207 was
applicable only to an accord and satisfaction by way of a "conditional
check." The court was not persuaded by this interpretation and stated
that "there is nothing in the language of the Code imposing such a lim-
ited application to U.C.C. section 1-207. We are required liberally to
construe and apply the provisions of the U.C.C. to promote [these] un-
derlying purposes and policies (U.C.C. section 1-102). " 31 Similarly, an
26. Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, 664
P.2d 419 (1983).
27. In re Zerodec Mega Corp., 47 Bankr. 304 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 60 Bankr. 884 (E.D. Pa. 1985), on remand, 59 Bankr. 272 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986). For
examples of jurisdictions where decisions are made without considering the interplay between
section 1-207 and the common law, see Field Lumber Com. v. Petty, 9 Wash. App. 378, 512
P.2d 764 (1973); Evans v. Columbia Int'l Corp., 9 Wash. App. 955, 478 P.2d 785 (1970).
28. Bivins v. White Dairy, 378 So. 2d 1122, 1124 (Ala. App. 1979), cert. denied sub nom.
Exparte Bivins, 378 So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 1980).
The term "explicit," as used in § 7-1-207, means that which is so clearly stated
or distinctively set forth that there is no doubt as to its meaning .... [T]he words
"without recourse" [do] not indicate an explicit reservation of rights as required by
§ 7-1-207.
In fact, the words "without recourse" are held to express a declaration of the
absence of responsibility.
Id. at 1123-24.
29. Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779 (Alaska 1983).
30. Continental Information Sys. Corp. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 A.D.2d 316, 321, 432
N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1980).
31. Id. at 320, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
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appellate court in Texas32 held that not reserving rights in accordance
with section 1-207 did not constitute a waiver of these rights because
"the statute provides machinery for reserving contractual rights, but fail-
ure to do so does not compromise a party's position in later proceedings
under the Code. The statute is permissive rather than mandatory."33
Where the creditor has retained the debtor's check bearing a legend
of full payment, the courts have held that mere retention in the creditor's
possession of that check without any additional act of negotiation consti-
tutes an accord and satisfaction.34 On the other hand, where the creditor
retains the check and notifies the debtor that the checks are not being
accepted on the tendered terms, courts have held that such notice
reserves the creditor's right to recover the balance.35
One Florida case had suggested at the trial level that the creditor-
payee must notify the debtor-drawer of his reservation of rights prior to
negotiating the check. The court of appeals, however, rejected this argu-
ment, stating that "[t]o require actual notification prior to negotiation
would eviscerate the purpose of the section .... [A] Florida statute...
in this instance frees up or minimizes impediments to the flow of com-
mercial paper while reserving the rights of the immediate parties.",
36
Moreover, if a creditor-payee causes a check to be certified, rather than
cashing the check, the court will deem the certification to be an accept-
ance or a satisfaction of the accord. This results because the effect of a
bank's certification of a check is the cashing of funds: in both situations
the funds are removed from the debtor's control.37
In a case where a creditor deposited the funds with the county clerk
without benefitting himself, the court held that since the funds had effec-
tively been removed from the debtor, there was an acceptance and a con-
sequent satisfaction.38 In a different case, however, a check was
32. Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture, Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977). For
the opposite judicial viewpoint, see Shea-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Department of Water and
Power, 73 Cal. App. 3d 679, 140 Cal. Rptr. 884 (1977). Here, only the seller's express reserva-
tion of rights in view of the buyer's breach preserved the seller's rights to contest the breach
despite his continued delivery under the contract. Failure to have made this explicit expres-
sion while continuing to make deliveries, the court held, would have been a fatal course of
action for the seller. Id. at 690, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
33. Jon-T Farms, 554 S.W.2d at 747.
34. See, e.g., Miller v. Montgomery, 77 N.M. 766, 768, 427 P.2d 275, 276 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kowalsky, 186 Conn. 618, 620, 442 A.2d 1355, 1356 (1982).
36. Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
37. Lange-Finn Constr. Co. v. Albany Steel & Iron Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 15, 19, 403
N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1015 (1978).
38. Department of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 680, 610 P.2d 390, 395
(1980).
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deposited by the creditor's mailroom in accordance with the creditor's
internal procedures before that check could come to the attention of an
authorized representative of the creditor. In that case, the court held
that a waiver of section 1-207 could not take place until a responsible
individual in the creditor's organization received notice of the condi-
tional check.39 The court further held that if an explicit reservation of
rights is sent by letter on the first business day following such notifica-
tion, the requirements of the section have been met. In another case,
where the creditor did retain the proceeds of a check after it was cashed,
but immediately sent a letter after learning of the check, the court held
the accompanying letter to be "a proper and explicit reservation of rights
within the purview of section [1-207]." The court based its holding on
the fact that the debtor had been put on notice by the wording of the
letter.4°
1. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co.4
The most recent appellate level decision on the section 1-207 di-
lemma comes from the state of New York. The plaintiff, Horn Water-
proofing, brought an action in which it claimed a right to the balance due
for labor, services and materials furnished to the defendant, Bushwick
Iron Co. The parties had entered into an oral agreement whereby the
plaintiff agreed to perform certain repairs to the roof of the defendant's
building. The litigants conceded that under their contract a new roof
was to be installed if the initial repair job proved inadequate. Two work-
ing days after the initial repairs had been completed, the plaintiff in-
39. Slavenburg Corp. v. Kinli Corp., 36 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 8 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The
court, in an opinion authored by Judge Newcomer, stated:
I note that the statute makes no requirement that the reservation of rights be done in
any particular manner, and that the letter sent by plaintiff's Philadelphia counsel
probably gave defendant better and speedier notice of plaintiff's refusal to compro-
mise its claim than would mere obliteration of the conditional endorsement or the
writing of "without prejudice" on the check prior to deposit.
Id. at 13.
40. Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 11 Wis. 2d 317, 324, 330
N.W.2d 228, 231 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 116 Wis. 2d 95, 341 N.W.2d 655 (Wis. 1984).
The court, in an opinion by Judge Cane, held:
Although Honeywell retained the proceeds after the check was cashed, it sent a letter
to Flambeau immediately after it learned of the check .... Although the usual
method of reserving rights is for the payee to endorse the conditional check with
words indicating protest, Northern Trust had already negotiated the check without
authorization when Honeywell, the payee, learned of the transaction. A reservation
of rights via letter was the only route available to Honeywell, which it immediately
pursued. Honeywell therefore explicitly reserved its rights under sec. 401.207, and
its retention of the check proceeds did not effect an accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 324-25, 330 N.W.2d at 231.
41. 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310 (1985).
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formed the defendant that the entire roof needed replacement and
submitted an invoice for $1241.92 which allegedly represented the value
of those two working days. The defendant disputed that invoice, where-
upon the plaintiff revised the amount downward and submitted a second
invoice for $1081.00. The defendant also rejected this second invoice,
but this time tendered a $500.00 check with a restrictive endorsement.42
Before negotiating this check, the plaintiff endorsed it with the notation
that the check's presentation was made "under protest."
This case raised two issues: first, whether section 1-207 applied to
service contracts specifically and to non-Code-covered transactions gen-
erally; and second, whether the common-law doctrine of accord and sat-
isfaction was altered by section 1-207. The court of appeals laid to rest
the earlier case law distinction between Code and non-Code-covered
transactions43 and held that section 1-207 applies to all situations where
42. The restrictive endorsement in Horn Waterproofing read as follows: "'This check is
accepted in full payment, settlement, satisfaction, release and discharge of any and all claims
and/or demands of whatsoever kind and nature.'" Id. at 322, 488 N.E.2d at 57, 497 N.Y.S.2d
at 311.
43. In New York, the case law was divided according to the sales-services dichotomy.
Two decisions, both arising from the same judicial level (the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York), but from different departments, reached opposite conclusions.
In Ayer v. The Sky Club, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 863, 418 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1979), the plaintiff,
Ayer, appealed from dismissal of summary judgment on an action for the balance due for
services performed by the defendant club for a party given at defendant's premises. The court
held that section 1-207 applies to a service contract, stating that "[w]e perceive the transaction
underlying the billing dispute between the parties to be one in which, while occurring in an
area to which the statute Uniform Commercial Code might not expressly apply, nevertheless,
the rule of the statute should be applied." Id. at 864, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
By contrast, Geelan Mechanical Corp. v. Dember Constr. Corp., 97 A.D.2d 810, 468
N.Y.S.2d 68 (1983), dealt with a dispute about the amount due for "work and extras" on a
plumbing contract. A legal issue arose as to whether an endorsement by the debtor, Dember
Construction Corp., on the face of the check bearing the notation "Accepted in Full & Final
Payment on all Contract extras - C.O.'s etc." which was negotiated by the plaintiff, Geelan
Mechanical Corp., with the restrictive endorsement "subject to any claims by Geelan Mechan-
ical Corp. against Dember Construction Corp.," could prevent the application of section 1-
207. The court held per curiam that section 1-207 did not apply. The court stated:
Under New York law it is therefore almost beyond dispute that this contract-in
which barely any mention is made of "goods" to be "sold," while there is exhaustive
attention paid to the work to be performed-is not covered by the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. We are cognizant of the fact that in Ayer v. Sky Club, the Appellate
Division, First Department, held that section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code should apply in a case involving a dispute over a bill to plaintiff for a party
given at defendant's premises, despite that court's statement that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code might not expressly apply to the underlying transaction. However, in
view of the clear holding of the Court of Appeals in Milau, it is our opinion that the
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code should not be held to govern this stan-
dard form construction subcontract.
Id. at 811, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
In Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 828, 452 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1982),
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a check has been used irrespective of the underlying transaction.
Through use of the check, section 1-207 came to govern the result of the
case." The court of appeals further held that "[w]e are persuaded, how-
the court decided a dispute over royalties to be paid to plaintiff, Aguiar, for reproduction
rights to photographs. The court held that section 1-207 applies, stating:
It is this Court's determination that the facts in this case constitute the type of com-
mercial transaction contemplated by the men and women who drafted the U.C.C.
provisions, and that it is certainly one of those "vast number of similar situations" to
which the reasoning of the Code should be applied ....
.. .This Court finds that the business conducted between Mr. Aguiar and
Harper & Row was not one of those situations to which the U.C.C. clearly does not
apply, and, therefore, this court must deny the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.
Id. at 833, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 523 (emphasis added).
In Wm. McCaffery, Inc. v. Cointreau America, Inc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. (Callaghan) 1108
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983), the court held that "[s]ervice contracts, such as the one at bar, are
clearly not governed by the U.C.C." Id. at 1109.
At the lower New York court levels, the case law is similarly divided. In Blottner, Der-
rico, Weiss & Hoffman, P.C. v. Fier, 101 Misc. 2d 371, 420 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1979), the court
considered the issue of whether section 1-207. applied to a conditional check tendered by the
defendant Fier for legal services rendered which plaintiff negotiated while purportedly at-
tempting to reserve their rights to claim the balance. The court held:
The bill was based upon legal services rendered which, from its very nature, was
clearly unliquidated....
... The Uniform Commercial Code, however, is not applicable to the rendi-
tion of services....
While this statute may even give guidance to the court in a situation where its
application is not clear (cf. Ayer v. The Sky Club, Inc.), it cannot, in an area where it
clearly does not apply, be the basis for the overturning of the long and well settled
rule that the acceptance of a check in full payment of a disputed claim operates as an
accord and satisfaction of the claim.
Id. at 373-74, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 1002.
In United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 590 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court
stated that "[iln New York, electricity is not considered "goods" and the U.C.C. therefore is
not directly applicable to contracts involving the provision of electricity. However, the New
York courts have drawn upon the U.C.C. reservation of rights provision in areas to which the
Code does not expressly apply." Id. at 269 (footnote omitted).
44. Horn Waterproofing, 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310. The court
stated:
The provision [section 1-207] is set forth in the introductory article 1 .... Presuma-
bly, section 1-207, as with other provisions in the introductory article, is to apply to
any commercial transaction within the reach of one of the substantive articles-i.e.,
to any "Code-covered" transaction .... There is simply no language in section 1-
207 expressing or intimating a more restrictive intention to limit its application to
specific kinds of transactions particular to one of the articles, or sections, of the Code.
... Rather, the nonlimiting language of section 1-207 and its placement in the Code
with the other generally applicable provisions of article 1 is persuasive that the sec-
tion is, indeed, applicable to all commercial transactions fairly considered to be
"Code-covered"....
... Whether the underlying contract between the parties be for the purchase of
goods, chattel paper or personal services, the use of a negotiable instrument for the
purpose of payment or attempted satisfaction of a contract debt is explicitly and
specifically regulated by the provisions of article 3 and, therefore, undeniably a Code-
covered transaction.
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ever, that the common law was changed with the adoption of section 1-
207 pursuant to which a fairer rule now prevails.""5 The court, evidenc-
ing its familiarity with the section 1-207 debate, cited the relevant case
law on point in a footnote. The court also cited scholarly literature and
comments.46 The court discussed the two polarized positions repre-
sented in the academic literature.
On the one hand is the view typified by Corbin:
It is unfair to the party who writes the check thinking that he
will be spending his money only if the whole dispute will be
over, to allow the other party, knowing of that reasonable ex-
pectation, to weasel around the deal by putting his own mark-
ings on the other person's checks. There is no reason why § 1-
207 should be interpreted as being an exception to the basic
duty of good faith, when it is possible to interpret the two sec-
tions consistently.47
On the other hand is the view which finds that receipt of a full pay-
ment check by a good faith creditor creates a cruel dilemma for that
creditor.48 This view, in keeping with the intention of the Code drafters
to make the common law more liberal in commercial transactions, is that
section 1-207 should be viewed as abrogating the common law. "Offer-
ing a check for less than the contract amount, but 'in full settlement'
inflicts an exquisite form of commercial torture on the payee."4 9 This is
especially true since section 1-207 can be literally construed to lend itself
to such an interpretation, something which even the critics of this view in
the academic community concede.50 Furthermore, if section 1-207 is in-
Id. at 329-30, 488 N.E.2d at 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
45. Id. at 327, 488 N.E.2d at 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
46. The opinion quotes Dean Rosenthal's article extensively. See Rosenthal, supra note 1.
47. 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1279, at 473 (2d ed. Supp. 1984).
48. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-21, at 544-47 (2d ed.
1980).
49. Id. at 544.
50. Most notably, Rosenthal stated:
Article three ("Commercial Paper"), however, is a special case. Does the fact that a
check is used as the device to effect a settlement in itself bring the transaction within
the Code (and therefore make section 1-207 arguably applicable) even if the underly-
ing transaction was one not otherwise covered by the Code? Article three contains
no scope provision analogous to the "transactions in goods" language in Section 2-
102.
[I]t seems fairly clear that if such a check is tendered in settlement, the transac-
tion must be regarded as being within article three, and if section 1-207 is otherwise
relevant its application cannot be avoided by showing either that article one was not
meant to be applied to non-Code transactions or that the underlying obligation did
not arise out of one of the other substantive articles of the Code.
Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 70.
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tended to serve as the "flexible adjustment machinery" for the simplifica-
tion, clarification, modernization and continued expansion of commercial
practices, then that section must mark the death knell of the common-
law doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
The Horn Waterproofing court supported'this position by incorpo-
rating into its decision the Report of the State of New York Commission
on Uniform State Laws, which specifically addressed the issue of accord
and satisfaction and took the position that the common-law doctrine had
been altered. That report stated that "[t]he Code rule would permit, in
Code-covered transactions, the acceptance of a part performance or pay-
ment tendered in full settlement without requiring the acceptor to gam-
ble with his legal right to demand the balance of the performance or
payment."51 The court held that this report demonstrated the legisla-
ture's intent to change the common-law rule of accord and satisfaction.
That was the ratio decidendi of the case.
2. Early case law subsequent to the enactment of section 1-207
One of the first cases to rule on section 1-207 was the New York
case of Hanna v. Perkins.2 There, the defendant, on receipt of the plain-
tiff's bill for labor performed and material furnished, deducted an
amount for property damages he sustained, allegedly from the plaintiff's
negligence.5 3 The defendant did not dispute the bill, and this led the
court to hold that:
The check sent and endorsed by defendant attempts to compro-
mise a liquidated amount claimed by plaintiff against defend-
ant.... Where there is no bona fide dispute between the parties
as to the amount due, payment of a lesser sum than the amount
demanded will not operate as an accord and satisfaction.
... There can be no accord and satisfaction where there
was no dispute.
5 4
51. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK 19-20 (1961).
52. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1044, 1044 (1965).
53. Id. Defendant moved for summary judgment based on his common law defense of
accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff calculated that between July and October 1964, a balance of
$1204.90 was due for services performed and materials furnished to defendant. When defend-
ant was presented with the bill, he deducted $575 for property damages and tendered a condi-
tional check to plaintiff with the endorsement on the back of the check, "In full for labor and
material to date." Plaintiff negotiated the partial-payment check with the notation "Deposited
under protest." Id. Nowhere in the case are there facts either showing that the defendant
disputed the plaintiff's claim, or setting forth precisely how the alleged property damages
occurred.
54. Id. at 1045 (citations omitted).
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Therefore, the court held that the restrictive endorsement on the check
did not create an accord and satisfaction. In keeping with this holding,
the court found that, notwithstanding the lack of a bona fide dispute, 5
the adoption of section 1-207 and the remarks of the official commenta-
tor compelled the holding that the plaintiff had successfully reserved his
rights to collect the balance due. This case appears to stand for the twin
propositions that section 1-207 overruled the common-law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction and that section 1-207 applies to liquidated as
well as unliquidated claims.
The next case on point was decided by the Court of Appeals of
North Carolina. As in the earlier New York case of Hanna v. Perkins,56
Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp.57 involved a liquidated
claim since no controversy arose over the quality, quantity or price of
certain lumber which was the subject of the contract in question. 8 The
plaintiff, Baillie Lumber, cashed checks containing the restrictive en-
dorsement "with reservation of all our rights." Baillie Lumber subse-
quently demanded full payment of the balance due, but the defendant,
55. The court goes to great lengths to establish that the nature of the claim was liquidated,
since there was no "genuine, valid disputed claim," and "defendant does not dispute plaintiff's
claim, but urges ambiguously that plaintiff was negligent and damaged to an extent (not genu-
inely shown) personal property of the defendant." Id.
56. 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1044.
57. Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969).
58. Id. at 344, 167 S.E.2d at 87. The plaintiff, Baillie Lumber company, a lumber distribu-
tor, sued the defendant, Kincaid Carolina Corporation, a furniture manufacturer, for the bal-
ance due on lumber sold and delivered. Defendant conceded that the claim was not disputed
and that the contract price was $2447.61, the amount plaintiff demanded. The defendant was
faced with financial difficulties and through its attorneys wrote to its creditors. The attorney
enclosed a financial statement and offered the creditors a 35 percent settlement. The plaintiff,
by letter, agreed to the offer. The letter contained the following:
Provided that such letter and such Statement of Financial Position together contain
all of the relevent [sic] information which is needed to be furnished to enable us, as a
creditor of the Kincaid Carolina Corporation, to determine the action to be taken on
the proposal therein made to creditors and provided that payment is made to us on
or before September 20, 1967, we agree to accept 35% of our account in full
settlement.
Id. at 345, 167 S.E.2d at 87.
The defendant did not meet the deadline of September 20, 1967 but instead mailed two
separate checks dated February 27, 1968 and April 12, 1968. The notations on the face of the
checks respectively read, "[flirst instalment [sic] of agreed settlement" and "[flinal instalment
[sic] of the agreed settlement." Id. at 345, 167 S.E.2d at 87-88. The plaintiff, in each case,
negotiated the checks with the typed-in endorsement on the back of the checks reading,
"[w]ith reservation of all our rights." Id. at 345, 167 S.E.2d at 88. Payment of $856.66 was
made, leaving a balance of $1590.55 which plaintiff claimed was still due. Defendant, in re-
sponse, argued that plaintiff had agreed on the settlement, and in any event by accepting the
payment of a lesser sum, by cashing and keeping the proceeds of the two checks, an accord and
satisfaction had resulted with the consequence of a full and complete discharge. Plaintiff ar-
gued that section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code applied to this situation.
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Kincaid Carolina Corporation, refused to pay on the ground that there
had been an accord and satisfaction. As in Hanna, the issue in Baillie
was whether an endorsement of a check, with knowledge of a dispute as
to the amount due, constituted an acceptance in writing of the condition
on the check. The court held that the enactment of section 1-207 pre-
cluded an accord and satisfaction, even as to the liquidated amount
owed: "We think that the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
are applicable to the giving and receiving of the checks in this case."59
Commentators who wish to minimize the significance of the case point to
the fact that the Code only became effective after the transaction between
the parties was consummated. Therefore, they argue, this discussion was
merely dictum.' °
The next case on point, Scholl v. Tallman,6 came from the Supreme
Court of South Dakota. There, the plaintiff demanded payment for the
balance due on labor and materials furnished under a construction con-
tract.62 The defendants disputed the figure claiming that the appropriate
credit for cash payments had not been made and submitted a check for a
lesser sum which reflected this credit.
The plaintiff cashed the check only after noting on the check that
"restriction of payment in full [is] refused." The court held that a condi-
tional endorsement, particularly an explicit reservation of rights on a
check regarding a disputed and unliquidated claim, constituted an ex-
plicit reservation under section 1-207 sufficient to override the doctrine of
accord and satisfaction.
59. Id.
60. The U.C.C. became effective in the State of North Carolina at midnight on June 30,
1967. Although it is true that the goods were sold and delivered prior to that date, the checks
tendered in settlement were made after that date, in February 1968 and April 1968. Id. at 344-
45, 167 S.E.2d at 87.
61. 247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976).
62. The plaintiff, Scholl, had performed some construction work for the defendants, Mr.
and Mrs. Tallman, in the calendar year 1971. The plaintiff claimed the outstanding balance of
$2077.37 which the defendants disputed. Defendants submitted a $500.00 check with the
words "Wesley Scholl Settlement in Full for all Labor & Materials to Date" typed on the back
of the check. Id. at 491. Plaintiff cashed the check after scratching out the endorsement of the
defendants and by writing the words "Restriction of payment in full refused. $1,826.65 re-
mains due & payable." Id. On May 5, 1976, at trial, defendant produced two cancelled checks
in the amount of $850.00 which had not been reflected in plaintiff's books. Upon production
of these checks, plaintiff moved for a continuance to set his records straight and to determine
exactly the outstanding amount owed. Defendants, however, testified under oath that they had
also made additional payments. The plaintiff conceded that he had received some cash pay-
ment, but, he testified that he was unsure as to the amounts and the dates of these cash pay-
ments. When the trial resumed, plaintiff revised downward the outstanding amount due to
$907.29. The judge held for the defendants based on their common-law defense of accord and
satisfaction. Id. at 492-93.
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Until this decision, only two cases on this issue could be found. A
persuasive argument could be made that both Hanna v. Perkins and Bail-
lie Lumber dealt with section 1-207 only by way of dicta and thus had no
binding effect. In 1976, however, the court in Scholl dealt directly with
the issue for the first time, finding that section 1-207 overrode the doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction. The court specifically rejected the coun-
tervailing arguments in favor of retaining the common-law doctrine.
63
However, later decisions have criticized the Scholl court, noting that
South Dakota has always followed the minority view on this issue."
Certainly, it would have appeared that the majority view was that
section 1-207 tolled the death knell for the accord and satisfaction doc-
trine. What factors, then, led to the reversal of this opinion to the point
that these cases now represent the minority view?
Courts in those jurisdictions which determined that section 1-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code does not abrogate the common-law doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction have adopted at least five lines of
reasoning.
a. overlap of section 1-207 and section 3-802(3)
Dean Rosenthal,65 in an examination of the legislative history of sec-
tion 1-207, noted the curiosity in the apparent overlap between two iden-
tical sections, namely sections 1-20766 and 3-802(3),67 in the earliest
versions of the Code. By the 1956 version of the Code, however, section
3-802(3) had been deleted. Moreover, during the four-year period that
the two sections had co-existed, these sections did not refer to one an-
other. Dean Rosenthal believed that the drafters could not have in-
63. Id.
64. Jahn v. Bums, 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979). The court stated:
In only one of [the cases previously cited by plaintiff] was the reservation of rights
section of the Uniform Commercial Code ... determinative, and in that case the
court noted the establishment by statute in South Dakota of a minority position with
reference to accord and satisfaction before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code.
Id. at 831 (footnote omitted). See Note, Commercial Transactions, supra note 1; see also Com-
ment, Accord and Satisfaction, supra note 1.
65. See Rosenthal, supra note 1, at 58-61.
66. Section 1-207 Uniform Commercial Code provides that "[a] party who with explicit
reservation of rights performs or promises performance or assents to performance in a manner
demanded or offered by the other party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such
words as 'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like are sufficient."
67. Section 3-802(3) Uniform Commercial Code, as it appeared in its last (1952) version
provides that "[w]here a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is in full satis-
faction of an obligation the payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment
of the instrument unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken unconscionable ad-
vantage in the circumstances."
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tended these two distinct sections to cover the identical legal point.
Moreover, Dean Rosenthal argued that when section 3-802(3) was de-
leted in the 1956 Uniform Commercial Code draft, the drafters did not
undertake to transfer its provisions to section 1-207. The argument thus
proceeds that section 1-207 never covered the common-law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction, either at its inception or as an historical post-
script to section 3-802(3). The courts in Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton
Appliance Co.68 and Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory
Ranch, Inc. 69 accepted this argument.
68. 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980). In that case, the defendant, a retail store,
purchased twelve home video systems for $2785.64 from the plaintiff, a wholesale distributor.
After delivery of the units, the parties disputed the quality of the merchandise delivered and
the repair services offered by the plaintiff. Id. at 346, 418 A.2d at 1327. Although the parties
agreed to the return of eight units, only four units were returned. The parties also disagreed as
to the wholesale price of each item. The plaintiff claimed a balance owing of $979.88, while
the defendant claimed that only $734.88 was owed to plaintiff. Id. Defendant submitted a
check in the amount of $734.88 with the notation on the front "paid in full." The plaintiff
negotiated the check adding a "without prejudice" endorsement on the back of the check. Id.
The court, quoting extensively from Dean Rosenthal's article, stated:
Rosenthal noted that despite the apparent overlap of §§ 1-207 and 3-802(3) there
was no indication in the Official Comments that these sections were intended to deal
with the same subject matter although somewhat inconsistently. In fact, the drafters
of the Code had failed to append any cross-references to either section. The absence
of such references "suggests that § 1-207 was not conceived as affecting the efficacy
of the full payment check."
Id. at 351-52, 418 A.2d at 1330 (citation omitted).
69. 63 Or. App. 364, 664 P.2d 419 (1983). In Ivory Ranch, the plaintiff claimed the bal-
ance of $1,210.03 on an account for tires, service and finance charges. The defendant asserted,
by way of defense, that the plaintiff had waived the right to collect the finance charges and that
consequently, the true amount owed was $1092.63. Thereupon, when defendant tendered a
check of $1164.93 to the plaintiff, he wrote on the face of the check, "[b]y endorsement this
check when paid is accepted in full payment of the following account." Plaintiff negotiated the
check, after crossing out the words "PAID IN FULL" and writing instead "[a]ccepted under
protest and with reservation of rights." The trial court found for the plaintiff, deciding that
section 1-207 applied reversing the common-law rule of accord and satisfaction. The appellate
court reversed the judgment of the trial judge and held:
The history of ORS 71. 2070 intimates that its drafters did not intend or foresee
that it would alter accord and satisfaction .... At that time Section 1-207 coexisted
with another provision of the code that codified and expanded the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction .... Section 3-802(3) expanded the common law by permitting ac-
cord and satisfaction when the obligation is undisputed and liquidated. Because the
section might have been "open to abuse," it was deleted in the 1957 Official
Draft.... The instructive value in Section 3-802(3) is that it existed entirely without
reference to Section 1-207. The comments to neither section referenced the other ....
This background indicates that the drafters of Sections 1-207 and 3-802(3) probably
did not intend to write overlapping sections regarding accord and satisfaction but,
rather, conceived of them as unrelated....
We believe that section 1-207 was designed to serve a purpose unrelated to ac-
cord and satisfaction. Its purpose was to protect against waiver and estoppel.
Id. at 371, 664 P.2d at 422-23 (citation omitted).
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b. overlap of section 1-207 and section 1-103
Similarly, section 1-103 of the Uniform Commercial Code can be
utilized to counteract a literal application of section 1-207. Litigants
have successfully argued that section 1-103 preserves the common law to
the extent that it has not been explicitly displaced by statute: "Unless
displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law
and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity
to contract,... shall supplement its provisions."'70  Those who wish to
sustain the pre-Code rule advance the rationale that the common law in
all areas, including the contractual area of accord and satisfaction, re-
mains in effect unless explicitly displaced by a particular Code section,
either in the text or in the Official Comments to the text. Since such an
intention is not clearly apparent with respect to the common-law doc-
trine of accord and satisfaction, this doctrine should continue to govern
notwithstanding a contrary indication from a literal reading of the text.
Courts in several jurisdictions have accepted this argument.71
70. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978).
71. For example, in Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 A.2d 1008
(Me. 1984), the defendant appealed from an order which held that section 1-207 abrogated the
common-law rule of accord and satisfaction. In reversing the lower order and vacating the
judgment, the court held:
[W]e look to the relationship between sections 1-207 and 1-103 .... in order to lay to
rest any contention that section 1-207 alters the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction.
We first note that the premise set forth in 11 M.R.S.A. § 1-103 (1964) is instruc-
tive in interpreting the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in this State. Section
1-103 provides that principles of law and equity are not to be displaced unless done
so explicitly. Significantly, section 1-207 makes no mention of displacing the com-
mon law doctrine of accord and satisfaction and thus should not be interpreted to
effectuate such an intent.
Id. at 1010-11.
Similarly, in Department of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 610 P.2d
390 (1980), a Washington court held that section 1-207 was not applicable to a conditional
check tendered by J-Z Sales as "payment in full" for surplus fish and fish eggs. The order of
the lower court held that the department's acceptance of the check constituted an accord and
satisfaction notwithstanding section 1-207. In affirming, the appellate court stated:
Elsewhere in the Uniform Commercial Code, RCW 62A.1-103 and official com-
ment 1 thereto require that the principles of law and equity are not to be displaced by
particular provisions of the Code unless done so explicitly by the Code .... The
statute does not explicitly supersede the law pertaining to accord and satisfaction,
and it should not be inferred as doing so.
Id. at 681-82, 610 P.2d at 395-96.
The same result was reached in Milgram Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 550 F. Supp.
992 (W.D. Mo. 1982). In that case, the court held that a full payment check constituted an
accord and satisfaction and was not displaced by section 1-207. The court was mindful that
section 1-103 specifically mandated that common-law principles were to remain intact unless
"explicitly displaced." Id. at 997.
Finally, in Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 58, 184 Cal.
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c. literal construction of section 1-207-performance
Another line of cases, typified by Jahn v. Burns,72 has emphasized
the literal meaning of the words "party who with explicit reservation of
rights ... assents to performance in a manner.., offered by the other
party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. ' 73 These words are
construed to mean that the debtor's reservation of rights on a check can
never be the subject of assent by the creditor to that negotiable instru-
ment because the assent must be to performance in a manner offered.
However, in the case of a reservation of rights, there is never an assent to
performance in "a manner... offered" because the part payment is spe-
cifically conditioned on its being in full settlement.74 Thus interpreted,
the section focuses on continuation of performance in an existing con-
Rptr. 436, 437-38 (1982), a California court also held that section 1-207 does not eliminate the
applicability of the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. The court, quoting from
the Uniform Code Comment to section 1-103, stated:
"This section indicates the continued applicability to commercial contracts of all
supplemental bodies of law, except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this
Act."... It may not reasonably be said that the former decisional, or common law
rule, was 'explicitly displaced' by the California Uniform Commercial Code's section
1207.
Id.
72. 593 P.2d 828 (Wyo. 1979). In Jahn, the plaintiff and defendant were involved in a car
accident. The defendant mailed a $200 settlement check with an accompanying letter which
stated, "'I intend this check as payment in full for all personal and property damages resulting
from our accident of Feb. 10, 1978.'" Id. at 829. The plaintiff scratched out this notation,
endorsed the check with the notation "'[d]eposited under protest and with full reservation of
all my rights,'" and cashed the check. The court held that an accord and satisfaction had
been effected of this unliquidated claim. In focusing on the meaning of the words "assent to
performance in the manner offered," the court held that "[t]he words of the statute are plain.
Construction or interpretation ... is unnecessary. In construing a statute, its words must be
given their plain and ordinary meaning." Id. at 830.
73. U.C.C. § 1-207.
74. See Milgram Food Stores, 550 F. Supp. at 997. For decisions of other jurisdictions
making use of identical legal reasoning, see Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App,
454, 261 S.E.2d 266 (1980). Brown involved an employment contract in which the plaintiff
worked as a salesman on a commission basis. A dispute arose as to the actual amount of
commission owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff cashed the defendant's check marked "account
in full" after striking out these words. In upholding the lower court's ruling that an accord
and satisfaction had been effected by the cashing of the check notwithstanding section 1-207,
the court, quoting from the Official Comment to section 1-207, held that the common-law rule
had not been changed:
From reading the Official Comment, it would appear that this section applies when
one party desires to continue performance under a contract without waiving any
rights in a pending dispute. The plaintiff in this case did not propose to continue to
perform but did want to preserve his right to collect his claim in full. This was
apparently not within the coverage of the section as contemplated in the Official
Comment.
Id. at 457-58, 261 S.E.2d at 268.
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tract rather than on a new agreement between the parties, which is the
case in an accord and satisfaction.
Both the case law and the scholarly literature have criticized such a
literal construction. In American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats,
Inc.,7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held: "We reject this reasoning [of
Jahn v. Burns]. By defining the term 'assent to performance' as 'accept-
ance of the condition,' the Supreme Court of Wyoming defeats the policy
expressed in section 1-207 that a party be permitted to reserve rights
under a contract. '76 The premise of this argument is that the judiciary is
defeating the intent of the drafters to liberalize the law. Consequently,
section 1-207 is said to "provide machinery for the continuation of per-
formance along the lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending
dispute, by adopting the mercantile device of going ahead with delivery,
acceptance, or payment 'without prejudice,' 'under protest,' 'under re-
serve,' 'with reservation of all our rights,' and the like."
'77
This interpretation implies that an accord and satisfaction involves a
new contract, not the contemplated performance of the original contract.
A proposal to preserve this right to collect a claim in full is not a propo-
sal to continue to perform. Certainly, through the usage of the "full pay-
ment check," or the "conditional check," the defendant is seeking to
fulfill, not to continue, his duty.78 Thus, the application of section 1-207
75. 153 Ga. App. 383, 265 S.E.2d 325 (1980). The defendant, American Food Purveyors,
after accepting shipment of certain food products, disputed their condition and claimed that
the $13,196.22 value claimed for these goods was in fact worth only $2696.08. Thus, they sent
a check for only this amount with the notation "'[tihis constitutes payment in full for all
indebtedness.'" Id. at 384, 265 S.E.2d at 326. After striking this endorsement, plaintiff
brought action for the balance. The defendant countered by arguing that the cashing of the
check constituted an accord and satisfaction. The court reversed the earlier judgment and held
that section 1-207 displaced the common law rule. Cf. Jon-T Farms, Inc. v. Goodpasture,
Inc., 554 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1977). The court stated that "[i]t is recognized that
the statute provides machinery for reserving contractual rights, but failure to do so does not
compromise a party's position in later legal proceedings under the Code. The statute is per-
missive rather than mandatory." Id. at 747. See Jahn, 593 P.2d 828; see also Note, Commer-
cial Transactions, supra note 1, at 1087-89.
76. American Food Purveyors, 153 Ga. App. at 327, 265 S.E.2d at 386.
77. U.C.C. § 1-207 Comment 1 (1978). Comment 1 is also quoted extensively in Chancel-
lor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980).
78. Brown, 44 N.C. App. at 457, 261 S.E.2d at 268. See supra note 71. In Stultz Electric
Works, the court held that because an unambiguous notation of full payment is an accord, or
an offer to create a new contract, the reservation of rights constitutes a counter-offer. Since the
debtor never had an opportunity to respond to this counter-offer, there could not have been an
"assent to performance offered." The court also held that section 1-207 arguably applies only
to cases involving installment deliveries. 484 A.2d at 1011 n.6. See also supra note 78 for an
alternate holding in the case.
In Milgram Food Stores, the court held that "section 400.1-207 is by its own terms inap-
plicable to the situation presented here. Feld did not assent 'to performance in a manner...
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is limited to continuing disputes in an executory contract because "sec-
tion 1-207 was designed to serve a purpose unrelated to accord and satis-
faction. Its purpose was to protect against waiver and estoppel. Without
the protection of [section 1-207] a party might waive the right to recover
fully by acquiescence in another's nonconforming conduct."79 In es-
sence, therefore, section 1-207 provides a mechanism whereby one party
can continue to carry forward his obligations under an ongoing contract
despite the fact that a dispute has arisen between the parties to that con-
tract and where the other party has expressly reserved his rights. There-
fore, section 1-207 is really an exception to the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction rather than a legal substitute for that doctrine.80
d. 'performance" versus '"ayment": the effect of The 1961 Report of
the Commission on Uniform State Laws to the Legislature of
the State of New York
Similarly relying on the literal meaning of the word "performance,"
some case law"' focuses on the fact that the word "payment" is not in-
cluded in the text of section 1-207. s2 Consequently, that section can, by
its very terms, never refer to conditional payment or to a check. Further-
more, if it had truly been the drafters' intent to have subsumed "pay-
ment" as a method of, or substitute for, "performance," then such a term
would have been used. The drafters must have chosen their words care-
fully. Where it later transpires that the drafters' choice was incorrect,
the legislature, and not the judiciary, is the appropriate body to correct
them. Until a legislative amendment has been effected, therefore, it is the
judiciary's role merely to interpret the words of the statute in accordance
with their plain meaning.
offered' because it rejected the essential condition upon which Milgram tendered the check-
full payment and settlement of all claims concerning the eleven vehicles." 550 F. Supp. at 997,
In Barber v. White, 46 N.C. App. 110, 264 S.E.2d 385 (1980), the court upheld the lower
court's ruling that the plaintiff's negotiation of a conditional check for house painting services
did not constitute an accord and satisfaction, but was instead governed by section 1-207. The
court, quoting Brown, held that the statute by its plain language could not apply to full pay-
ment checks. Id. at 113, 264 S.E.2d at 386.
79. Ivory Ranch, 63 Or. App. at 371, 664 P.2d at 423 (citation omitted).
80. In re Zerodec Mega Corp., 47 Bankr. 304, 308 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985).
81. Hixson v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (court of appeals affirmed lower
court ruling that plaintiff-creditor's acceptance and cashing of conditional check tendered by
defendant-debtor for engineering services performed by plaintiff constituted accord and satis-
faction notwithstanding section 1-207).
82. Id. at 331. "Section 1. 207 bespeaks of 'performance,' by one party or the other, but
does not speak of 'payment,' whether as demanded, or less than demanded conditioned on
settlement." Id.
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A stronger argument is found in the New York Annotation to the
Code which states:
This section permits a party involved in a Code-covered
transaction to accept whatever he can get by way of payment,
performance, etc., without losing his rights to demand the re-
mainder of the goods, to set-off a failure of quality, or to sue for
the balance of the payment, so long as he explicitly reserves his
rights ....
... The Code rule would permit, in Code-covered transac-
tions, the acceptance of a part performance, or payment ten-
dered' in full settlement without requiring the acceptor to
gamble with his legal right to demand the balance of the per-
formance or payment.
3
Consequently, a jurisdiction which either did not adopt the New York
Study Commission's report or which conducted its own analysis of the
Code84 could not have given any indication to its legislature that a
change of the common-law rule was intended. Thus the New York posi-
83. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS TO THE LEGISLATURE OF
THE STATE OF NEW YORK, at 19-20 (1962) (emphasis added).
84. See Chancellor, 175 N.J. Super. 345, 418 A.2d 1326.
The court stated:
The New York cases which have concluded that § 1-207 permits a party to re-
serve his rights while cashing a check offered in full payment are distinguishable.
The New York annotation clearly deals with the effect of section 1-207 on the
"full-payment check" and concludes that the rule of accord and satisfaction has been
changed. However,... the New Jersey Study Comment did not adopt the New York
Study Commission's report and conducted its own analysis of the Code.
Id. at 349, 418 A.2d at 1328-29. The following states by their own comments to the statute,
have indicated that section 1-207 displaces the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfac-
tion: Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-207 (1975), Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1-
207 (West 1966), Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 1-207 (West 1958), Min-
nesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-207 (West 1966), New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 382-A:1-207 (1961), and New York, N.Y. COM. LAW § 1-207 (McKinney 1964). The fol-
lowing by their own comments to the statute, appear to limit section 1-207 to "goods,"
although a specific disclaimer to the common-law doctrine of accord and satisfaction is not
made: California, CAL. COM. CODE § 1207 (West 1964), Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26, § 1-
207 (Smith-Hurd 1963), Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 400.1-207 (Vernon 1965), New Jersey,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:1-207 (West 1962), North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-207
(1965), Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1207 (Purdon 1984), and Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.1-207 (1966). The following states, by their own comments to their
statutes, appear to disclaim section 1-207: Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 671.1207 (West 1966),
and Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 1-207 (1964). Finally, the following states have
neither adopted the official comments nor their own comments to section 1-207: Oregon, OR.
REV. STAT. § 71. 70 (1984), South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 57A-1-207 (1980),
and Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-126 (1977).
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tion, once judged to be in the forefront of the majority position, evolved
into the minority view.
e. public policy considerations
Many decisions have been based on "public policy" considerations.
The following statement is typical:
If the court were to conclude that a creditor could reserve
his rights on a "full payment check," a convenient and informal
device for the resolution of disagreements in the business com-
munity would be seriously impeded. The court is hesitant to
impair such a valuable, informal settlement tool where there is
no indication that the legislature intended that result."
Courts are reluctant to dispose of a convenient tool for the compro-
mise of a dispute by permitting unilateral action by a protesting credi-
tor. 6 This argument is especially persuasive in a court system which is
overburdened and understaffed. However, the pivotal question is
whether the "better" substantive law rule should be rejected merely be-
cause of an administratively failing court system. Is it appropriate to
respond to a substantive legal question with an administrative response?
A countervailing argument on public policy grounds alone comes
from a decision of the Court of Appeals of the State of Wisconsin1
7
where the court stated:
Although some have criticized this interpretation on the
ground that it may discourage settlements and unfairly favor
creditors, it is also recognized that the common-law doctrine of
accord and satisfaction often gives debtors an unfair advantage
85. Chancellor, 175 N.J. Super. at 352, 418 A.2d at 1330.
86. In Pillow v. Thermogas Co., 6 Ark. App. 402, 644 S.W.2d 292 (1982), an argument
arose over the correct amount of debt for fertilizer supply at a set per acre application cost.
The court of appeals held that section 1-207 does not abrogate the common law rule of accord
and satisfaction, stating:
We hold that § 85-1-207 has not altered our common law rule of accord and satisfac-
tion. If we were to decide that a creditor can reserve his rights on a "payment in
full" check, it would seriously circumvent what has been universally accepted in the
business community as a convenient means for the resolution of disagreements....
A unilateral action by the creditor in protest or an attempted reservation of rights by
the alteration of a check offered as payment in full is of no legal consequence.
Id. at 404-05, 644 S.W.2d at 294.
87. In Flambeau Products, Ill Wis. 2d 317, 330 N.W.2d 228, Honeywell sold computer
equipment to Flambeau and granted it a $14,000 computer programming credit to be used by
Oct. 1, 1976. Flambeau, in a check following the expiration date, deducted $14,000 for unused
programming. At trial, the judge concluded that an accord and satisfaction had occurred.
Finding that section 1-207 applied in such a transaction, the appellate court reversed the trial
court's decision.
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over creditors, and that section 1-207 may be an effort 'to bal-
ance the scales.88
III. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 1-207 TO CODE AND
TO NON-CODE TRANSACTIONS
The Horn Waterproofing89 case also highlights the recurring ques-
tion concerning what transactions section 1-207 governs. In Horn Wa-
terproofing, the New York Court of Appeals resolved the problem for
New York. However, some other jurisdictions have reached opposite
conclusions. 90
Before Horn Waterproofing, a series of conflicting decisions 9' in
New York state had arisen as to the status and applicability of section 1-
207 to service contracts. There was significant case law which held that
the Code clearly did not apply to non-sales-related transactions. How-
ever, the uncertainty involved categories of service transactions which
had their payment settled by check. The question is whether the issuance
of a check invokes section 1-207 even if the underlying transaction is not
Code covered. The New York Court of Appeals recognized the sales-
service dichotomy and held that to determine whether the Code applies
88. Id. at 323, 330 N.W.2d at 230.
89. Horn Waterproofing, 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310.
90. Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 291 N.W.2d 636 (1980), involved an appeal
from the lower court's judgment that found an accord and satisfaction to have been effected
where a conditional check had been tendered to settle differences between contracting parties.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision because the contract called for the
performance of services (house siding) and section 1-207 could not be applicable to service
contracts. The court stated:
"The test for inclusion or exclusion [within the Code] is not whether they are mixed,
but, granting that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust,
their purpose, reasonably stated, is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally
involved ... or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved .... "
... We conclude that the predominant factor.., is the furnishing of services,
with an incidental sale of materials.
Id. at 684, 291 N.W.2d at 639 (quoting Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974)).
In Jahn, the court stated: "The fact that a negotiable instrument was used in a transac-
tion does not make the entire transaction a commercial one.... If the other portions of the
transaction are not 'commercial,' the use of commercial paper does not cause them to fall
within the provisions of the code." 593 P.2d at 831. Cf. Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (section 1-207 held to apply to landscaping services). But see Eder v.
Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (section 1-207 held
not to apply to interior decorating services). At the same judicial level, the court chose to hold
directly in contradiction to the Miller case: "We ... certify that our opinion expressly and
directly conflicts with Miller v. Jung." Id. at 314. See also American Food Purveyors, Inc. v.
Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, 265 S.E.2d 325 (1980). "By limiting application of
§ 1-207 to 'commercial transactions' independent of the mode of payment, the court ignores
the fact that payment by check is a Code-covered transaction." Id. at 386, 265 S.E.2d at 327.
91. See supra note 43.
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to a hybrid transaction, a court must first determine which aspect of the
transaction predominates.92 Obviously, where the predominant charac-
ter of the transaction is service oriented, the Uniform Commercial Code
does not apply. Therefore, the use of a check to settle disputes relating to
such a contract would not import the rule of 1-207. 91 In other words, the
court would not permit the Code rule where it would otherwise be
inapplicable.
The conflicting New York appellate court view is typified by the
decision in Geelan Mechanical Corp. v. Dember Construction Corp.94
There, the Second Department of the Appellate Division stated:
The New York appellate courts have several times addressed
this issue in the context of construction contracts, guided by the
rule that a contract is one for the sale of goods only if the ele-
ment of transfer of personal property predominates over the el-
ement of work, service etc. . . . Under New York law it is
therefore almost beyond dispute that this contract-in which
barely any mention is made of "goods" to be "sold," while
there is exhaustive attention paid to the work to be per-
formed-is not covered by the Uniform. Commercial Code.95
An earlier case, also from the appellate division court level, but from
the First Department,96 held that the use of a check ipso facto caused
Code rules to apply. "We perceive the transaction underlying the billing
dispute between the parties to be one in which, while occurring in an area
to which the statute (Uniform Commercial Code) might not expressly
apply, nevertheless, the rule of the statute should be applied."97
This discrepancy was resolved in Horn Waterproofing. There, the
court held that where a negotiable instrument is used, the underlying
92. In Milau Assoc., Inc. v. North Ave. Dev. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 398
N.Y.S.2d 882 (1977), Justice Wachtler stated for the court: "[T]he court's sensitivity to these
policy considerations, rather than restrict the scope of its holding, should suggest the need to
assess all hybrid transactions along the sales-services continuum both legally and pragmati-
cally." Id. at 486, 368 N.E.2d at 1250, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
93. See United States v. Consolidated Edison Co., 590 F. Supp. 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (con-
tract to supply electricity); Geelan Mechanical Corp. v. Dember Constr. Corp., 97 A.D.2d
810, 468 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1983) (plumbing contract); Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
114 Misc. 2d 828, 452 N.Y.S.2d 519 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1982) (sales of reproduction rights to
photographs); Blottner, Derrico, Weiss & Hoffman, P.C. v. Fier, 101 Misc. 2d 371, 420
N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (legal services); Wm. McCaffrey, Inc. v. Cointreau
America, Inc., 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1108 (N.Y. 1983). See also supra note 43.
94. Geelan, 97 A.D.2d 810, 468 N.Y.S.2d 680.
95. Id. at 811, 468 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
96. Ayer v. The Sky Club, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 863, 418 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1979).
97. Id. at 864, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 58.
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transaction is disregarded, and the provisions of the Code apply without
exception. In settling the services-sales dichotomy, the court stated:
[The] nonlimiting language of § 1-207 and its placement in the
Code with the other generally applicable provisions of article 1
is persuasive that the section is, indeed, applicable to all com-
mercial transactions fairly considered to be "Code-covered."
... Whether the underlying contract between the parties
be for the purchase of goods, chattel paper or personal services,
the use of a negotiable instrument for the purpose of payment
or attempted satisfaction of a contract debt is explicitly and
specifically regulated by the provisions of article 3 and, there-
fore, undeniably a Code-covered transaction. Consequently, a
debtor's tender of a full payment check is an article 3 transac-
tion which is governed by § 1-207, regardless of the nature of
the contract underlying the parties' commercial relationship.98
Other jurisdictions have decided this issue in a different way:
Regardless of its construction, [section] 1-207 of the code
cannot apply unless the underlying transaction is subject to the
code.... Section 2-102 of the Uniform Commercial Code...
provides that unless the context otherwise requires, that chap-
ter applies to transactions in "goods."
...In determining whether a mixed contract for goods
and services is a sale of goods under the code, the "test for
inclusion or exclusion [within the Code] is not whether they are
mixed, but, granting that they are mixed, whether their pre-
dominant factor, their thrust, their purpose reasonably stated,
is the rendition of service, with goods incidentally involved...
or is a transaction of sale, with labor incidentally involved ....
[W]e conclude that the predominant factor [in this case] is the
furnishing of services, with an incidental sale of materials. Ac-
cordingly the transaction is not subject to the Uniform Com-
mercial Code-... and [section] 1-207 of the code ...is
inapplicable.99
98. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 329-30, 488
N.E.2d 56, 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 316 (1985).
99. Van Sistine v. Tollard, 95 Wis. 2d 678, 684, 291 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Section 1-207 has engendered extensive controversy to the point of
creating a majority-minority schism in the common-law doctrine of ac-
cord and satisfaction. The majority view gives effect to the use of the
"full payment" check, or the "conditional" check, as a means to facilitate
compromise. For public policy reasons, those jurisdictions adopting the
majority view prefer to help effect a private resolution of disputes rather
than to refer these disputes to an overburdened court system. Those ju-
risdictions subscribing to the minority position have succeeded in herald-
ing the demise of the common law of accord and satisfaction. Much can
be said for the benefits of maintaining the private sector as a forum for
compromise through the continued use of the accord and satisfaction
mechanism. However, one must also remain alert to the possibility that
this view may unduly favor the debtor. Because of this split, however,
counsel should conduct careful research to determine whether the appli-
cable jurisdiction follows the majority or the minority view. A service
transaction also raises the issue whether section 1-207 applies.
